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This study investigates the interaction between firm size and IPO underpricing in the US and 
Canadian markets between the years 2007-2016.  We find a size effect on IPO underpricing 
in both Canada and the US, which is larger for Canadian firms. Canadian small firms show 
more underpricing than US small firms (19.32% vs. 13.87%). Large Canadian firms also 
exhibit more underpricing than their US counterparts over the sample period (12.83% vs. 
10.09%). A size effect on performance is not apparent for holding periods beyond six months 
from the IPO in both countries, consistent with seasoning effects that reduce information 
asymmetries across firms over longer investment horizons. 
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Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are significant events in the evolution of start-up firms, when 
shares of the company are sold to institutional and retail investors to be subsequently traded 
on one or more stock exchanges. They provide new equity capital for investment in firms’ 
projects, allow founders and private equity investors a means to capture some of the returns 
from their initial stakes in the firm. Furthermore, they facilitate liquidity for current and 
future investors, which is useful for expanding the firm’s investor base, as well as for raising 
capital as the company grows. IPO’s have puzzled researchers for at least half a century.1 The 
pioneering studies of Ritter (1984,1987) spotlight the IPO underpricing phenomenon, of high 
first day returns (from the offer price to the first day closing price) for IPO’s. Over the period 
1980-2018, Ritter et al. (2018) show significant IPO underpricing in the US, averaging 18.4% 
returns based on proceeds-weighted portfolio and 17.9% based on equally-weighted portfolio. 
This suggests that there may be a negative size effect, given that equal weighted portfolios 
attach more consideration to small firms. Whether this is due to the distribution of IPO’s (e.g. 
micro-caps vs. traditionally defined small caps vs. mid-sized companies) is a largely 
unexplored question.  Indeed, based on pre-IPO sales of the underlying companies, higher 
first day returns are observed for smaller companies.  In particular, over the period, 1980-
                         
1 See e.g. Stoll and Curley (1970) Logue, Ibbotson (1975), Baron (1982)  Ritter (1984,1987) Rock (1986), 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Alon and Brav (1997), (Mok and Hui, 1998)  Loughran 
and Ritter (1992,2002),  Jain and Kini (1994), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003), Kooli and 
Suret (2002), Kryzanowski, Lazrak and Rakita (2005), Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), Ljungqvist (2007), 





2016 first day IPO returns are on average 18.6% (8.6%) for firms with pre-IPO sales less 
(greater) than $1 billion. 2 For Canada, where IPO’s are comprised of smaller firms than in 
the US, IPO underpricing over the period 1987-2017 is found to be more modest, averaging 
5.6%.3  
This paper provides new evidence for Canada and the US on the phenomenon of IPO 
underpricing, the high returns from the initial offering price to the first day closing price as it 
relates to firm size. Ritter (1984) posits that size should play a role in IPO underpricing, as it 
proxies for ex ante uncertainty about the firm’s prospects. This can explain the high ex post 
first day returns for small firms based on sales shown in the Ritter data. Ljunquist (2007) 
suggests that informational effects, especially informational asymmetries are overriding 
factors in explaining IPO underpricing.  More recently, Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) 
buttress this approach. They show that small, young, high-tech, VC-backed, NASDAQ firms 
experience higher IPO underpricing. In other words, higher IPO underpricing for small firms 
may be risk related: simply put, small companies have prospects that are difficult to value, 
and should command higher returns to compensate for this risk.4  Fama and French (1993, 
2015, 2018) include a size factor in their model for stock returns, as a fundamental factor that 
is a reasonable proxy for expected cash flows. Indeed, the Fama and French size factor 
                         
2  https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
3 Canada’s first-day IPO returns are derived from Ritter https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ and 
extend the series of Kryzanowski, Lazrak and Rakita (2005),Kooli and Suret (2002) show less  underpricing in 
Canada relative to the US  for the period 1997-1999. 





(SMB) on Ken French’s database, over the period July 1963-January 2019 shows an average 
annual excess return for small caps of 2.92%. We reexamine the question of higher initial 
returns for smaller firms using more recent data for the US and provide new evidence on this 
score for Canada. We also provide some new evidence on the role of firm size as it relates to 
the question of longer horizon performance of IPOs in the US and Canada. In addition to re-
examining the role of firm size in short run and longer run IPO performance, we also 
incorporate uncertainty factors affecting IPO returns as in Lowry, Offer, and Schwert (2010).   
Furthermore, we consider the role of internal governance mechanisms in explaining IPO 
initial returns and long-term IPO performance.  
We find that on average, smaller firms have higher IPO underpricing in both the US and 
Canada. We also find that holding constant firm size, CEO dominance and size of top 
management team are negatively related to IPO underpricing in the US, but not in Canada. 
We do not find a differential size effect on the performance of firms beyond a six-month 
horizon from the IPOs for Canada or the US, consistent with a seasoning effect that reduces 
the information asymmetries across firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 will provide a brief review of 
the literature and present the hypotheses for testing.  A description of the data and the 
methodology are provided in section 3.  The results follow in section 4. This paper concludes 





2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
IPO underpricing has been a fairly well-established empirical regularity in the literature over 
the years. The recent literature has sought to identify factors associated with this 
phenomenon. Ljunquist (2007) summarizes the literature into four approaches: a) focusing on 
the role asymmetric information – in particular where informed investors (e.g. institutions) 
earn the bulk of the gains at the initial allocations, at the expense of uninformed (e.g. retail) 
investors; b)  looking at the role of institutions: e.g. threats of lawsuits, the effects of 
investment banks in price stabilization, and tax effects; c) control effects: how underpricing is 
a means to entrench the positions of founding shareholders; d) behavioral – particularly the 
role of shareholder irrationality as prices are bid up to levels well above fundamental 
valuation.  He concludes that the bulk of the evidence supports the a), the informational 
approach.  In particular, consistent with Rock (1986) winners’ curse, he suggests that  
a) most of the underpricing-related gains accrue to informed (or at least institutional) 
investors; uninformed (or at least retail) investors earn little or no excess returns from 
investing in IPOs. Furthermore, informed investors affect the investment bank’s choice of 
offer price; and  
b) underpricing across firms increases in the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding a firm’s 
valuation. 
Our paper focuses on b), the role of ex ante uncertainty across firms. Our proxy for 
uncertainty is firm size.   
The “small firm effect,” whereby small cap firms earn higher risk adjusted returns than large 




(1983), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and more recently Switzer (2010).  Switzer (2012, 
2013) looks at the time varying nature of the small cap premium and show that it is related to 
the default risk premium.  All of the variants of Fama and French (1993, 2015, 2018) factor 
models, incorporate the size factor (SMB) to capture market fundamentals, as reflected in 
long run outperformance of small firms over long periods of time. Ritter (1984) states that 
size should play a role in IPO underpricing: to the extent that smaller firms are exposed to 
higher ex ante uncertainty, they should be expected to have greater underpricing/higher first 
day returns. This result is also shown by Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010), who show 
higher average initial returns and variability of initial returns are observed for smaller firms 
that are more difficult to value.   
Hypothesis 1: Smaller firms in Canada and the US will have greater IPO underpricing 
as reflected in first day returns 
While short-term IPO underpricing is fairly well-established phenomenon in most markets, 
the longer-term performance of IPO’s is a matter of some controversy.  Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) provide evidence that IPO’s underperform in the long run in the 
US. Gompers and Lerner (2003) and Schultz (2003) dispute this result on methodological 
grounds.5 Kooli, L’Her and Suret (2003) show that underpriced IPOs in Canada outperform 
in the long run, especially growth and financial sector IPOs. The role of firm size in longer 
term IPO performance has not received significant attention in the literature. To the extent 
that information asymmetries decline over time with seasoning of the IPO’s one might expect 
                         




that the gaps in performance between smaller firms and larger firms would decline over 
longer horizons. In an early study, Stoll and Curley (1970) document a six month return 
excess return of small IPOs over the S&P index of 42.4%, which might be indicative of a 
positive size effect for extended horizons. Bartlett, Rose and Solomon (2017) show slightly 
higher 3-year gross cumulative returns for large IPOs compared to small IPOs held by mutual 
funds.  With the increased speed of information transmission through time, one might expect 
that seasoning effects might be observed for small IPO’s in general, not just those held by 
mutual funds.   
Hypothesis 2 Differential Performance between Small Firms and Large Firms will 
diminish over longer investor holding periods.   
As mentioned above, the long run performance of IPO’s in general has been a matter of 
contention. Our paper will provide new evidence on this issue. Hypothesis 2 focuses on the 
existence of a size effect, and extends the Bartlett, Rose and Solomon (2017) analysis to a 
wider sample of US IPO’s, and for the first time to a sample of Canadian IPOs.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Description of the Data 
The sample for the analyses consists of companies that are listed on the Amex-NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and the Toronto Stock Exchange. The primary source for the IPO data is the SDC 
Platinum database of Thomson Reuters Financial Securities new issue database and WRDS. 
And only issuers of common stocks are considered. Data of management quality is taken 




IPO database is used as a supplemental source for missing observations. The data from 
SDC’s on IPO characteristics are cross-checked with Capital IQ data as well as data from the 
Ritter IPO Database. The final sample consists of 4628 common stocks of firms with IPOs 
between 2007 and 2016, which includes 2364 US stocks and 2234 Canadian stocks. In this 
paper, we use winsorized data6 to avoid and mitigate the effects of spurious extreme values. 
In this paper, we use two criteria to measure firm size:  market capitalization of firms at the 
end of the first day of the IPO, and gross proceeds from the IPO.  
The second criterion used for firm size is gross proceeds of IPOs (Bartlett, Rose and 
Solomon, 2017). Small IPOs include IPO which received less than $54.4 million in gross 
proceeds in Canada and the US adjusted for inflation7. 
3.2 Modeling the Determinants of IPO Underpricing and Performance over Longer Horizons 
In addition to performing univariate analyses to examine differential IPO performance based 
on size proxies to capture issue uncertainty, we also conduct regression analyses to provide a 
multivariate perspective that incorporates the interactions between the independent variables. 
In particular, we extend the models of Ritter (1984), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) Lowry, Offer, and Schwert (2010) to incorporate 
governance/management quality features. The basic regression model used is as follows: 
                         
6
 Winsorization is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the 
effect of possibly spurious outliers. It is named after the engineer-turned-biostatistician Charles P. Winsor. In 
this paper, the winsorized mean is expressed as a weighted average abnormal returns of the truncated mean and 
the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
7 The US inflation issues are measured in US inflation adjusted dollars; Canadian issues are measured in 




𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝑎3𝑀𝑉𝑃 +  𝑎4𝑉𝐶 + 𝑎5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 +
𝑎6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎7𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝 + 𝑎8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠      (1)  
The dependent variable 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 is measured by abnormal returns for the IPO over 4 
subperiods: i) first day returns for the IPO; ii) returns over the 4-week horizon subsequent to 
the IPO; iii) returns over a horizon of 180 days after the IPO; iv) returns over a 1-year 
horizon from the IPOs. First day returns measure IPO underpricing. It is the abnormal return 
between the IPO offer price and the subsequent secondary trading market price. Abnormal 
returns are measured as (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝)/𝑝, where 𝑝 is the offering price and 𝑝𝑡 is the closing bid 
price on the specific day observed of public trading.  
We use three variables to capture size effects: i) gross proceeds in $MM (natural log) : 
Lnproceeds ; ii) small firm vs. large firm : an indicator variable based on firm size by gross 
proceeds, which equals to 1 if gross proceeds is greater than $54.4 MM,  equals to 0 
otherwise: Size_Dummy ; iii) Market capitalization in $MM(natural log), directly reflects 
market scale of IPO firms: lnMV. 
We also consider a number of control variables relating to the offerings characteristics that 
are expected to affect IPO returns aside from firm size. The first is a proxy for valuation 
uncertainty: the gross spread of the issue: Gross-spread. This variable captures to the fees (in 
$MM) that underwriters receive for arranging and underwriting the offering. We conjecture 
that higher gross spread should be associated with poorer performance of the IPO. We also 
look at the effect of so-called ‘Money left on the table.’ This variable is measured as the 




by the number of shares sold (in $MM). This variable is commonly viewed as another 
measure of underwriter compensation and denoted in the analyses as: MVP.  Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) argue that high values of the MVP variable may represent excess compensation 
for the services of analyst coverage; Hence this variable is expected to have a negative effect 
on IPO returns. Venture capitalists are financial intermediaries investing in start-up 
companies which provide capital to young high-technology firms that might have otherwise 
gone unfunded (Gompers, 2007). Ivanov and Xie (2010) find evidence that venture capitalists 
add value to start-up companies. Companies backed by venture capitalists tend to be riskier 
and have higher valuations at the IPO than non-VC-backed ones. Venture capitalists of 
issuing firms are frequently co-opted through the allocation of hot IPOs to their personal 
brokerage accounts Ivanov and Xie (2010). Venture capitalists may thus have incentives to 
work with the firms’ managers and key decision makers to choose lead underwriters with 
reputations or leaving money on the table in IPOs. (Loughran, Ritter, 2004). Hence, venture 
capital-backed IPOs are expected to have higher abnormal returns/ better performance across 
investment horizons. A dummy variable that captures venture capitalists in the analyses is 
VC which is set equal to 1 for IPOs backed by venture capitalists and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that asymmetric information between the issuer and 
institutional investors may lead to IPO underpricing and strategic rationing, when firms issue 
more than one class of shares. Extending their argument, we expect that IPOs with multiple-




with a dummy variable Multi-class that is set equal to 1 if the firm has more than one class of 
shares and 0 otherwise. 
We also examine the effects of the technological sector of the IPO using a dummy variable 
High-tech which equals one if the firm is in a high-tech industry (as defined by SDC), and 
zero otherwise. Kim, Pukthuanthong- Le and Walker (2007) find that high-tech firms have 
higher risk and uncertainty as reflected by higher price revisions and greater underpricing.  
Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) also find greater underpricing for high tech firms 
consistent with the hypothesis that the value of such firms is much more difficult to estimate, 
since it is directly dependent on [uncertain] growth options. They also show that the 
dispersion of returns is higher in IPO markets when High tech firms are more prevalent. 
One might argue that over the longer term (horizons beyond one month), the greater risks of 
default for high tech firms might be reflected in poorer performance. 
Another control variable that we consider in the analyses of IPO performance is the Lockup 
period. The Lockup period captures the time frame following the IPO in which insiders are 
proscribed from selling stocks from their allotments. The most common Lockup periods are 
90 days, 180 days, and 360 days. The Lockup period variable, Lockup is measured in days. 
Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) develop a model in which managers strategically 
underprice IPOs to maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. They 
find that IPO underpricing is positively correlated with stock returns and insider selling at the 
lockup expiration. Brav and Gompers (2003) note that Lockups serve several roles: a)  to 




“pump and dump”  whereby shares are sold after promoters have artificially bid up prices to 
unsustainable levels; b) to signal of firm quality ; c) to permit underwriters to extract 
additional compensation from firms. The empirical evidence on their effects is mixed. 
Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi (2001), Field and Hanka (2001) and Ofek and Richardson 
(2003) find that lockup expirations result in a permanently increase in trading volume, and 
statistically significant stock price declines of about 1.5%. Cao, Field and Hanka (2004) 
suggest that lockup expirations improve market liquidity. The Lockup period variable, 
Lockup is measured in days. On balance, we expect that lockup period has a positive effect 
on IPO underpricing, but a negative effect on longer term performance, as insiders dispose of 
their shares after the lockup period. 
In addition, proxies for management quality are considered in our model for the determinants 
of IPO returns. Switzer and Bourdon (2011) look at the effects of management quality on the 
operating performance and Tobin’s Q of Canadian firms first in the first year from their IPO. 
We focus on two variables from that study: a) CEO dominance over other team members 
measured by the ratio of the CEO salary to the average salary of other members of the 
management team and b) Size of top management team, defined as the number of managers 
with the rank of vice-president or higher in the management team. Based on Fama and Jensen 
(1983), the degree of CEO dominance is expected to have a negative relationship with the 
stock market performance of the IPO’s. Team size effects might be less clear: while larger 
teams might be deemed beneficial to the extent that they provide more diverse ideas to 




specific, reflecting differences in industry distributions (see e.g. Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005)). 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the distribution of IPOs and average IPO underpricing of large 
firms and small firms in the US and Canada for the period 2007-2016.  In sharp contrast with 
the US, most IPO’s in Canada are small (classification of gross proceeds), throughout the 
sample period.  However, with the exception of the financial crisis period (years of 2008-
2009), the proportion of small IPO’s increases in the U.S. over time. On average, IPO 
underpricing is higher for small firms than large firms in the US and Canada. IPO 
underpricing tends to peak in the years 2011-2014. After 2014, there is slight decline of IPO 
underpricing in both the US and Canada. On average Canadian small firms exhibit more 
underpricing than their US counterparts. IPO underpricing is fairly similar in both countries.  
Large firms in Canada on average exhibit higher underpricing than their US counterparts over 
the sample period (12.83% vs. 10.09%). Canadian small firms also show more underpricing 
than US small firms (19.32% vs. 13.87%).  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 shows the distribution of abnormal returns for IPO’s in the US and Canada classified 
by firm size (measured by gross proceeds) over the sample period 2007-2016 for alternative 
investment horizons (one day, 30 days, 180 days, and one year). In the US, larger IPO’s are 
more prevalent than small IPO’s (1407 vs. 987), although the average returns for smaller 




predominate ((2145 vs. 121). and small firms have comparably larger abnormal returns than 
large firms across all investment horizons. 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.1 Issue Characteristics of Small Firm IPOs vs. Large Firms IPOs 
Table 3 shows the distribution of IPO issue characteristics classified by firm size groupings 
(large vs. small based on gross proceeds) for US and Canadian firms over the period 2007-
2016.  The columns tabulate IPO underpricing, Money on the table, Offer price, Gross spread 
and Total assets. Money on the table is the difference of market value between the offer date 
and the first day after offering. Gross spread is the total fees that underwriters receive for 
arranging and underwriting an offering of equity securities. As might be expected, in both 
countries, large firms have comparably higher offer prices, money left on the table, higher 
gross spread and higher total assets. On the contrast, large firms have comparably lower 
excess returns than small firms both in the US and Canada. On average, US small and large 
firms leave money on the table than their Canadian counterparts. 
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistic of returns across different return horizons and firm/issue 
size characteristics for Canadian and US IPOs over the period 2007-2016. Panel A (B) looks 
at all Canadian (US) firms together. Panels C and E look at Canadian and US small firms, 
respectively. Panels D and F look at Canadian and US large firms, respectively. Compared 




day, 180-day than US firms. On average, small firms have better return performance than 
large firms for all investment horizons (1-day, 30-day, 180-day, 1-year) for Canadian firms.  
Large firms in the US have better returns after 180 days. For Canadian firms, the differential 
initial IPO excess return between small firms and large firms is 18.96%-13.09% = 5.87%; 
The differential of excess return for a 30-day horizon is 22.13%-12.54% = 9.59%; Over a 
180-day horizon, the differential of excess return is 18.38%-10.12% = 8.26%; Over a one 
year the differential is 17.91% - 7.73% = 10.18%. For US firms, the one-day differential of 
excess return is 14.64% - 11.35% = 3.29%; differential for 30-days is 14.29% - 13.08% = 
1.21%; differential for 180-day is 13.36% - 13.96% = -0.6%; differential for one year is 
11.74%-12.67%=-0.93%. Compared with Canadian firms, the average differential of excess 
return of US firms is smaller than for Canadian firms, and the average excess return of large 
firms exceeds small firms in the longer period. 
Furthermore, large firms have higher gross spreads than small firms in the US and Canada, 
which means underwriters receive more fees for arranging and underwriting the offering. 
Money left on the table are higher for large firms than small firms both in the US and 
Canada. US small firms leave more money on the table than Canadian small firms (9.84M vs 
3.03M), and US large firms leave 203.63M money on the table compared with 162.05M of 
Canadian large firms. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for IPO’s returns across alternative investment horizons 




reports the estimates for Canadian firms. On average, Canadian small firms that are in high 
tech, VC-backed, with multi-class share structures, and have longer lockup periods have 
better returns than their large counterparts for all investment horizons. US small firms that are 
in high-tech and multi-share structures show better performance than US large firms only on 
the first day of trading. With a 30-day holding period, US small firms in high-tech do not 
perform better than US large firms in high-tech. US small firms with VC-backing and long 
lockup periods do not show an obvious difference in returns with US large counterparts.  
In both the US and Canada, firms that are in high-tech, VC-backed, with long lockup periods 
outperform firms that are in non-high-tech, non-VC-backed, with short lockup period, while 
there is no big gap between companies with multi-class shares vs. their single share class 
counterparts. 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 6 shows the Pearson Correlation statistics table for the US sample and Canadian 
sample. Panel A shows the results for US sample, and Panel B shows the results for Canadian 
sample. Multivariate variables in the OLS regressions have compared each other. 
Correlations and directions among variables are quite similar for US and Canadian firms. 
There is no strong linear relationship (correlation coefficient > 0.5 or < -0.5) among the 
independent variables in the regressions. 




Table 7 shows the OLS regression results for the models of IPO performance given by 
equation (1) for the US and Canada separately. In this regression, we use lnproceeds as a size 
proxy measuring firm size by natural logarithm of gross proceeds. We find some interesting 
country differences in the analyses. Consistent with our hypotheses, US firms, lnproceeds has 
a significantly negative effect on 1-day and 30-day returns: in other words, smaller firms 
provide better  performance based on initial returns (consistent with Lowry, Officer and 
Schwert (2010)),  and 30-day cumulative abnormal returns than large firms; for the longer 
holding period of 180 days there is no significant relationship between lnproceeds and IPO 
returns. For Canadian firms, a negative size effect is observed across all holding periods, but 
it is not significant. Venture Capital backing is positive and significant across all investment 
horizons in the US consistent Ivanov and Xie (2010). VC backing in Canada is positive 
across all horizons, but not significant. For US firms, consistent with Aggarwal, Krigman and 
Womack (2002), longer lockup periods are positively and significantly related to short 
horizon returns (one day and one month).  The lockup period does not appear significant for 
Canadian firms.  However, CEO dominance, as reflected by the differential compensation to 
CEOs relative to other members of the management team is significantly negatively 
associated with performance across all holding periods, only for Canadian IPOs.  Large 
management teams are detrimental to one month and 180-day performance measures for US 
firms, but not Canadian firms.  Finally, ‘money on the table’ (MVP) has a significantly 




(2002).  This effect is not observed for Canadian firms. Gross Spread has a positive effect for 
one day returns in the US and Canada, although it is not significant at conventional levels. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 8 reports the results of the multivariate regressions using the Size_dummy variable as a 
firm size proxy (which equals to 1 for large firms (more than $54.4 million) and equals to 0 
for small firms (less than $54.4 million). Most of the results are consistent with those 
reported in Table 7, although the negative size effect is only significant for the one day 
returns horizon. Interestingly, the CEO dominance variable is significantly negative for the 
one day returns of US firms.  For Canadian firms, CEO dominance has a significantly 
negative effect across all horizons.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
In Table 9, we report the results of the the multivariate regression, using the market 
capitalization variable: use lnMV as firm size proxy variable. On the whole, the results ae 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using the other firm size proxies, although the CEO 
dominance variable for US firms is not significant.  In Canada, CEO dominance continues to 
have a detrimental effect on stock returns, as in Tables 7 and 8. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5. Conclusion 
The paper provides evidences in support of a size effect for IPO performance in both Canada 
and the US.  Two benchmark criteria are used to distinguish large firms vs. small firms: gross 




find support for a significant size effect: for short investment horizons: in both Canada and 
the US, smaller firms have greater IPO underpricing, suggesting that this may be due to 
greater uncertainty in the valuation of smaller firms. It is also consistent with Lowry, Officer 
and Schwert (2010). We do not find a differential size effect on the performance of firms 
beyond a six-month horizon from the IPOs for Canada or the US, consistent with a seasoning 
effect that reduces the information asymmetries across firms. Some clear country differences 
are observed in the analyses. Venture Capital backing and lockup periods have significant 
effects for the US firms, but not Canadian firms. Evidence shows that in Canada, venture 
capitalists cannot eliminate adverse selection and moral hazard. Furthermore, these problems 
are more acute for younger and start-up firms which assets are less and firm scales are small. 
Venture capitalists are better at dealing with informational problems than are other investors, 
but this advantage shows up most in later stage entrepreneurial firms rather than at the start-
up stage (Amit, Brander and Zott, 1998). In addition, they also predict a negative relationship 
between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance in Canada. CEO 
dominance appears to have a larger detrimental effect on Canadian firms. Whether these are 
due to differential behavioral or institutional factors between countries remains a topic for 
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Table 1  
Table 1 shows the distribution IPOs and underpricing over the sample period (2007-2016) Panel A shows the number of IPOs in 
US and Canada categorized by firm size. Panel B looks at the distribution based on underpricing and firm size. Firm size is 
measured by (the inflation adjusted) gross proceeds. 
Panel A Number of IPOs 
Year 
US Canada 
Large Small Total % small Large Small Total % small 
2007 241 59 300 19.67% 22 353 375 94.13% 
2008 56 20 76 26.32% 14 282 296 95.27% 
2009 150 85 235 36.17% 8 230 238 96.64% 
2010 157 121 278 43.53% 10 242 266 90.97% 
2011 107 130 237 54.85% 13 213 214 94.25% 
2012 139 110 249 44.18% 4 183 187 97.86% 
2013 177 138 315 43.81% 8 157 165 95.15% 
2014 180 133 313 42.49% 9 124 133 93.23% 
2015 113 86 199 43.22% 13 138 151 91.39% 
2016 87 105 192 54.69% 20 191 211 90.52% 
Avg N/A N/A N/A 40.89% N/A N/A N/A 94.49% 
Total 1407 987 2394 N/A 121 2113 2234 N/A 
Panel B IPO underpricing 
Year 
US Canada 
Large Small Large Small 
2007 9.92% 18.62% 9.51% 20.20% 
2008 2.34% 7.72% 10.44% 9.65% 
2009 6.45% 8.65% 14.35% 15.36% 
2010 6.38% 9.84% 13.07% 23.20% 
2011 8.41% 14.24% 10.32% 25.72% 
2012 12.26% 19.73% 13.24% 23.10% 
2013 15.63% 11.75% 10.56% 11.54% 
2014 15.99% 17.02% 14.09% 25.25% 
2015 15.31% 13.97% 20.18% 18.57% 
2016 8.16% 17.11% 12.52% 20.56% 



















Table 2 Distribution of IPO abnormal returns  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of IPO abnormal returns for US and Canadian large firms and small firms for the period 
2007-2016. Abnormal returns are shown for holding periods of 1 day, 30 days, 180 days and 1 year after the IPOs issue date. 
Firm size categories are based on the gross proceeds (in MM) of the issue. 
US Large firm 







Return 1 day 
Abnormal 





return 1 year 
2007 241 243.10 70.31 9.92% 7.98% 10.42% 7.35% 
2008 56 987.06 76.22 2.34% 0.02% -24.31% -23.70% 
2009 150 289.39 70.01 6.45% 9.70% 25.03% 31.82% 
2010 157 373.88 72.00 6.38% 7.72% 16.14% 14.62% 
2011 107 344.55 80.76 8.41% 8.12% 2.54% 3.01% 
2012 139 224.57 75.02 12.26% 15.65% 24.02% 19.45% 
2013 177 317.04 72.00 15.63% 19.67% 28.45% 21.49% 
2014 180 297.40 72.00 15.99% 19.64% 23.28% 25.68% 
2015 113 217.27 70.02 15.31% 19.71% 16.64% 12.35% 
2016 87 304.85 75.00 8.16% 13.94% 24.35% 25.06% 
Total 1407 377.56 73.33 11.35% 13.08% 13.96% 12.67% 
US Small firm 
2007 59 25.61 72.28 18.62% 14.26% 7.47% 5.96% 
2008 20 18.75 65.58 7.72% 7.19% -14.15% -12.40% 
2009 85 16.34 65.80 8.65% 11.82% 22.92% 18.60% 
2010 121 15.40 67.75 9.84% 19.94% 15.78% 11.84% 
2011 130 12.20 66.00 14.24% 2.97% 10.73% 0.63% 
2012 110 13.90 66.93 19.73% 21.77% 17.37% 29.36% 
2013 138 18.74 68.83 11.75% 12.29% 19.67% 12.57% 
2014 133 20.60 66.24 17.02% 18.71% 2.88% 5.53% 
2015 86 18.96 65.00 13.97% 7.95% 11.58% 17.46% 
2016 105 20.27 68.50 17.11% 19.14% 12.74% 14.79% 
Total 987 17.62 67.29 14.64% 14.29% 13.36% 11.74% 
Total US 2394 196.30 70.31 12.73% 13.04% 13.54% 11.98% 
Canadian Large firm 
2007 22 171.14 64.58 9.51% 15.87% 1.38% -7.87% 
2008 14 63.32 57.96 10.44% -6.77% -31.07% -18.64% 
2009 8 108.23 93.74 14.35% 14.38% 15.94% 14.60% 
2010 10 202.29 136.99 13.07% 14.55% 21.35% 6.14% 
2011 13 73.19 53.51 10.32% 11.60% 11.52% 17.59% 
2012 4 82.80 84.15 13.24% 15.65% 5.21% 9.19% 
2013 8 134.27 43.47 10.56% 6.73% 10.02% 4.99% 
2014 9 98.26 95.40 14.09% 11.98% 12.02% 15.74% 
2015 13 245.76 124.44 20.18% 18.40% 19.62% 20.53% 
2016 20 211.83 138.69 12.52% 9.75% 18.18% -3.17% 
Total 121 139.11 89.29 13.09% 12.54% 10.12% 7.73% 
Canadian Small firm 
2007 353 1.83 0.51 20.20% 25.10% 25.30% 19.99% 
2008 282 1.17 0.50 9.65% 17.54% -3.85% -7.40% 
2009 230 1.61 0.50 15.36% 20.12% 22.16% 19.61% 
2010 274 1.79 0.52 23.20% 23.47% 20.19% 22.46% 
2011 213 1.95 0.53 25.72% 18.72% 24.57% 26.19% 
2012 183 2.05 0.49 23.10% 27.44% 19.92% 15.46% 
2013 157 1.54 0.54 11.54% 23.23% 17.40% 26.05% 
2014 120 1.30 0.50 25.25% 18.80% 21.06% 26.96% 
2015 130 2.21 0.51 18.57% 11.88% 18.57% 21.87% 
2016 191 1.94 0.52 20.56% 23.64% 25.71% 19.42% 
Total 2133 1.74 0.51 18.96% 22.13% 18.38% 17.91% 





Table 3 Distribution of IPO issue characteristics classified by firm size groupings (large vs. small based 
on gross proceeds) 
This table shows the distribution of the IPO issue characteristics for US and Canadian firms over the period 2007-2016.    
The data are collected from SDC Platinum, WRDS, and Thomson Reuters. IPO underpricing is the first-day return after IPOs. 
Money on the table is the difference of market value between the offer date and the first day after offering. Gross spread refers to 
the fees that underwriters receive for arranging and underwriting an offering of debt or equity securities. 
Panel A. Means of Canadian firms 
Year Number of IPOs IPO underpricing Money on the Table Offer Price Gross Spread Total Assets 
  Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
2007 375 9.51% 19.18% 205.11 7.27 
 
7.62 0.53 0.28 0.09 2421.51 15.91 
2008 296 10.44% 9.74% 63.34 2.11 5.11 0.37 0.34 0.03 352.38 11.20 
2009 238 14.35% 15.27% 60.15 5.64 2.55 4.64 0.19 0.04 471.38 20.42 
2010 272 13.07% 18.63% 183.50 1.22 6.91 7.74 0.24 0.07 1031.34 12.45 
2011 221 10.32% 22.10% 241.84 0.65 9.21 4.98 0.36 0.35 492.12 14.58 
2012 187 13.24% 17.37% 89.40 0.77 10.12 0.54 0.53 0.24 1705.77 47.53 
2013 150 10.56% 10.08% 143.33 1.85 7.55 0.72 0.38 0.31 2898.95 30.37 
2014 133 14.09% 18.81% 43.50 1.02 9.14 0.24 0.75 0.18 588.56 29.64 




211 12.52% 17.94% 208.74 3.62 12.98 0.69 0.68 0.14 1574.83 64.01 
 
 
Total 2234 12.83% 19.32% 162.05 3.03 11.29 2.48 0.31 0.06 2498.63 38.87 
Panel B. Means of US firms 
Year Number of IPOs IPO underpricing Money on the Table Offer Price Gross Spread Total Assets 
  Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
2007 300 17.26% 17.43% 132.94 26.74 16.06 9.00 0.94 0.53 2067.89 165.35 
2008 76 9.34% 2.57% 817.94 7.11 21.03 8.81 0.98 0.60 6875.21 446.44 
2009 235 5.83% 2.88% 181.41 5.39 16.01 5.93 0.78 0.37 23676.3 462.31 
2010 278 10.33% 15.44% 150.96 13.22 16.74 6.13 0.88 0.42 3962.41 444.45 
2011 237 17.59% 12.36% 253.08 34.92 17.68 4.79 0.96 0.38 1991.85 307.03 
2012 249 19.46% 17.89% 118.61 8.32 17.92 4.61 0.96 0.35 1279.18 313.61 
2013 315 15.55% 17.53% 210.32 4.90 22.90 6.58 1.11 0.52 3980.44 167.98 
2014 313 18.64% 15.30% 176.51 13.81 17.78 6.70 0.98 0.50 3544.70 156.30 
2015 199 14.69% 15.36% 147.63 14.72 21.39 6.47 1.04 0.50 1921.49 258.74 
2016 192 19.30% 13.24% 169.16 6.91   23.02 6.11 1.04 0.46 5702.91 264.85 
 
 









Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for Returns and Firm/Issue Size Characteristics across different return 
horizons for Canadian and US IPO firms 
This table provides descriptive statistics for cumulative abnormal returns and various firm/issue characteristic for Canadian and 
the US IPOs over the period 2007-2016. The data provided are collected from SDC Platinum, WRDS, and Thomson Reuters. 
IPO underpricing is the first-day return after IPOs. The variables are defined as Offer price, Rsp1day, Rsp30days, Rsp180days, 
Rsp1year, Gross Spread, MVP, Total Assets, Market Valueafter offer..Rsps are abnormal returns in different investment horizons.  
Gross spread (in MM) refers to the fees that underwriters receive for arranging and underwriting an offering of debt or equity 
securities. MVP (in MM) is the difference of market value between the offer date and the first day after offering. This table 
represents the descriptive statistics of each variable for Canada, US, and small firms and large firms separately. Results of 
number, means, maximum, minimum, range, and standard deviation are shown in the table. Data is derived from SDC Platinum, 
WRDS.  
Panel A Canadian firms  
Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 2247 3.23 199.00 0.01 198.99 47.40 
Rsp1day 2247 15.94% 1125% -96.00% 12.21 94.37 
Rsp30days 2247 16.77% 990% -91.67% 19.07 117.34 
Rsp180days 2146 15.20% 757.14% -92.67% 8.50 125.58 
Rsp1year 2050 13.06% 766.67% -90.91% 8.58 156.01 
Gross Spread 2083 0.33 3.40 0.01 3.39 1.52 
MVP 1463 113.28 1643.40 -2794.70 4438.10 29783.24 
Total Assets 2132 391.92 38462.70 0.10 38462.80 8289.54 
Market Valueafter offer 2186 624.74 74829.10 14.80 74814.30 30537.41 
VC 33 1.46% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 26 1.62% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 211 9.43% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 1058 120.94 365 30 335 19.52 
CEO dominance 1045 8.14 200 0.01 199.99 10.13 
Size of management team 564 6.35 19 2 17 2.60 
 Panel B US firms       
Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 2380 13.47 265.00 0.01 264.99 14.51 
Rsp1day 2380 12.73% 750.00% -77.05% 8.27 64.74 
Rsp30days 2380 13.47% 910.00% -80.19% 9.90 53.41 
Rsp180days 2159 13.54% 1400.00% -87.92% 1.49 81.69 
Rsp1year 2307 11.98% 1900.00% -96.73% 2.00 106.95 
Gross Spread 2274 0.80 8.88 0.01 8.87 0.69 
MVP 2235 162.40 10432.70 -4116.60 14539.30 3653.05 










VC 450 18.94% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 80 3.93% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 872 36.62% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 1761 148.13 730 17 713 58.48 
CEO dominance 735 8.08 212 0.04 211.96 11.03 













Table 4 continued 
Panel C Canadian Small firms 
Panel C Canadian Small firms Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 2135 2.35 41.88 0.01 41.87 42.28 
Rsp1day 2135 18.96% 1125% -96.00% 12.21 120.45 
Rsp30days 2135 22.13% 990% -91.67% 19.07 132.03 
Rsp180days 2042 18.38% 757.14% -92.67% 8.50 101.40 
Rsp1year 1964 17.91% 766.67% -90.91% 8.58 137.96 
Gross Spread 1992 0.16 2.09 0.01 2.08 1.56 
MVP 1356 3.03 4194.70 -429.80 4624.50 29479.51 
Total Assets 2037 192.53 7976.39 0.10 7976.29 7182.61 
Market Valueafter offer 2096 132.24 2115.20 0.10 2115.10 31487.09 
VC 22 1.03% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 25 1.65% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 200 9.01% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 998 118.95 365 30 335 15.13 
CEO dominance 980 8.33 200 0.01 199.99 8.18 
Size of management team 511 6.30 19 2 17 2.07 
Panel D Canadian Large firms 
Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 112 20.16 199.00 0.15 198.85 42.71 
Rsp1day 112 13.09% 142.85% -44.34% 1.87 148.53 
Rsp30days 112 12.54% 100.00% -74.63% 1.75 205.71 
Rsp180days 104 10.12% 186.50% -89.85% 2.77 62.68 
Rsp1year 86 7.73% 332.85% -88.71% 4.22 283.87 
Gross Spread 91 0.65 3.40 0.02 3.38 0.35 
MVP 107 162.05 1239.60 -2794.70 4034.30 8104.20 
Total Assets 95 2101.99 38462.70 14.80 38447.90 8087.52 
Market Valueafter offer 90 2484.20 74829.10 28.80 74800.30 18276.25 
VC 11 10.08% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 2 0.84% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 11 10.21% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 60 121.01 180 50 130 15.40 
CEO dominance 65 5.20 20.82 0.47 20.35 6.69 














Table 4 continued 
Panel E US Small firms 
Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 977 6.15 69.46 0.01 69.45 13.10 
Rsp1day 977 14.64% 750.00% -77.05% 8.27 101.32 
Rsp30days 932 14.29% 910.00% -80.19% 9.90 198.24 
Rsp180days 909 13.36% 1400.00% -87.92% 1.49 132.47 
Rsp1year 926 11.74% 1900.00% -90.26% 2.00 193.08 
Gross Spread 906 0.46 2.70 0.01 2.69 0.96 
MVP 934 9.84 6500.00 -2637.7 9137.70 3379.16 
Total Assets 960 287.37 8274.10 0.10 8274.00 15374.22 
Market Valueafter offer 965 177.06 41436.90 0.10 41436.80 6144.20 
VC 191 36.95% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 40 4.66% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 380 36.99% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 697 151.01 730 30 700 42.64 
CEO dominance 345 7.22 212 0.13 211.87 6.77 
Size of management team 764 7.62 20 3 17 1.36 
Panel F US Large firms       
Variable Number Mean Maximum Minimum Range Std Dev 
Offer Price 1403 18.57 265.00 0.20 264.80 21.08 
Rsp1day 1403 11.35% 206.67% -68.54% 2.76 86.41 
Rsp30days 1403 13.08% 246.67% -72.40% 3.19 137.33 
Rsp180days 1182 13.96% 334.36% -79.03% 4.13 156.46 
Rsp1year 1381 12.67% 815.60% -96.73% 9.12 127.62 
Gross Spread 1368 0.96 8.88 0.03 8.85 0.56 
MVP 1301 203.63 10432.70 -4116.60 14549.30 4127.04 





Market Valueafter offer 1396 2109.47 159636.20 
 
45.00 159591.20 6857.76 
VC 259 19.17% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Multi-calss 40 3.45% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High-tech 492 36.49% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Lockup 1064 146.24 390 17 373 35.05 
CEO dominance 390 6.31 96 0.04 95.96 7.23 





Table 5 summary statistics for IPO’s returns across alternative investment horizons according to issue feature and industry characteristics 
Table 5 shows summary statistic for different IPO. It also shows average IPO returns for small vs large firms across industry and issuer characteristics. Data comes from SDC Platinum, Thomson Financial Securities 
Data and other resources. The sample is from 2007 – 2016. Further description of how country, size, industry, VC-backed, Lockup, and multi-class shares are defined. The returns are performed by US and Canada, and 
by large firms and small firms separately. Firms descriptions of how high-tech, VC-backed, and multi-class are defined by SDC platinum database. Firms are classified by lockup period on the basis of whether the 
lockup periods are higher or lower than the median period. T-statistics (P-value) are reported for two-sided tests on whether estimates are different from zero. Statistical significance is indicated at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
(***) levels. 
Panel A US Comparisons 
 US Large firm US Small firm 





























































































































































Panel B Canada comparisons 
 Canadian Large firm Canadian Small firm 

































































































































































Table 6 Correlation Matrix 
This table is correlation matrix table for explanatory variables. Variables includes Lnproceeds, Size_duumy, LnMV, gross spread, MVP, VC, Multi-Class, High-tech, Lockup, CEO dominance and Size of management 
team. Panel A and Panel B represent correlations of US firms and Canadian firm separately. Statistical significance of correlations is indicated as P-value in the second row of each correlation. 
Panel A US firms            
 Lnproceeds Size_dummy LnMV Gross Spread MVP VC Multi-Class High-tech Lockup CEO dominance Size of management team 
Lnproceeds  1.00000           
Size_dummy 0.75630 
<0.001 
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    Panel B Canadian firms 
 Lnproceeds Size_dummy LnMV Gross Spread MVP VC Multi-Class High-tech Lockup CEO dominance Size of management team 
Lnproceeds  1.00000           
Size_dummy 0.78941  
<.0001 
1.00000          
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Table 7 shows results of OLS regressions showing the relationship between IPO performance and firm size of US and Canada firms. The regression equation is 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 +
𝑎2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝑎3𝑀𝑉𝑃 + 𝑎4𝑉𝐶 + 𝑎5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎7𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝑎8lnAssets + 𝑎9𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠. Return is abnormal return at subperiods after IPOs, 
measured from the first aftermarket closing price to the earlier date. Lnproceeds measure the firm size by natural logarithm of gross proceeds, which is the natural logarithm of gross proceeds. Gross proceeds are 
measured in millions of dollars. Gross Spread represents underwriter fees, and MVP refers to Money on the Table. VC refers whether firms are backed by venture capital or not. MultiClass represents a term of voting 
in board by using dummy variable. HighTech is a dummy variable verifying a firm belonging to high-tech or not. Lockups is a contractual restriction that prevents insiders who are holding a company's stock. CEO 
Dominance is the dominance of the CEO over the other team members. It is calculated as the ratio of salary of the CEO to that of the other members of the management team. Size of management teams is defined as 
the number of managers with the rank of vice-president or higher in the management team.  P-values are in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
Variables Intercept lnproceeds Gross 
Spread 









US firms            
Returnone day 
after 
13.08** -2.86*** 3.47* -0.002** 6.51** 1.56 2.72 0.08** -0.09 -0.13 15.99 
(2.70) (-6.83) (1.77) (3.27) (2.30) (0.24) (1.20) (3.27) (-0.81) (-0.35)  
Return 1 month 
after 
27.59*** -2.63*** 3.23 -0.002 8.39** -5.28 0.21 0.07* -0.15 -1.01* 7.36 
(4.13) (-4.59) (1.20) (-0.96) (2.21) (-0.59) (0.07) (1.86) (-0.98) (-2.03)  
Return180 days 
after 
54.23*** -1.55 0.56 -0.003 18.53** -16.40 -3.51 -0.05 -0.38 -2.30** 2.56 
(5.67) (-1.49) (0.11) (-0.85) (2.84) (-1.01) (-0.62) (-0.94) (-1.35) (-2.55)  
 Return1 year 
after 
67.04*** 0.02 -3.98 -0.001 22.34** -23.67 -3.14 -0.12 -0.65 -2.01 1.41 
(3.87) (0.01) (-0.54) (-0.17) (2.27) (-0.97) (-0.37) (-1.62) (-1.59) (-1.50)  
Canadian Firms           
Returnone day 
after 
33.39** -0.29 29.35 0.001 13.73 10.61 -17.64 0.03 -2.82*** -1.11 3.81 
 
(2.44) (-0.29) (1.19) (0.37) (0.51) (0.34) (-1.65) (0.40) (-5.22) (-0.79)  
Return 1 month 
after 
51.24** -1.72 8.84 -0.006 27.80 17.08 -14.74 -0.002 -3.61*** -1.82 2.96 
 
(2.62) (-1.20) (0.26) (-1.34) (0.76) (0.40) (-0.94) (-0.01) (-4.80) (-0.96)  
Return180 days 
after 
40.67 -0.11 -24.53 -0.007 27.88 23.95 -12.17 -0.04 -3.44** -2.04 0.87 
 
(1.14) (-0.04) (-0.38) (-0.90) (0.40) (0.30) (-0.44) (-0.20) (-2.46) (-0.55)  
 Return1 year 
after 
40.93 -0.45 -53.88 -0.007 8.70 42.31 2.22 0.21 -3.55* -7.34 0.67 





Table 8 shows results of the OLS regressions for the relationship between IPO performance and firm size of US and Canada firms. The regression equation is 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +
𝑎3𝑀𝑉𝑃 + 𝑎4𝑉𝐶 + 𝑎5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎7𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝑎8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠. Return is abnormal returns at subperiods after IPOs, measured by the first aftermarket 
closing price to the earlier date. Size_dummy is dummy variable defined by gross proceeds, which equals to 1 for large firms and equals to 0 for small firms. Gross Spread measures firm costs when going public in 
terms of underwriter fees. MVP measures Money on the Table. VC refers whether firms are backed by venture capital or not. MultiClass represents a term of voting in board by using dummy variable. HighTech is a 
dummy variable verifying a firm belonging to high-tech or not. Lockups is a contractual restriction that prevents insiders who are holding a company's stock. CEO Dominance is the dominance of the CEO over the 
other team members. It is calculated as the ratio of salary of the CEO to that of the other members of the management team. Size of management teams is defined as the number of managers with the rank of vice-
president or higher in the management team. P-values are in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels. 
Variables Intercept Size_dummy Gross 
Spread 









US firms            
Returnone day 
after 
3.50 -3.65* 3.65 -0.001 8.02** -0.04 2.81 0.10** -0.06* -0.27 9.90 
(0.63) (-1.86) (1.64) (-0.60) (2.66) (-0.01) (1.15) (3.71) (-2.18) (-0.69)  
Return 1 month 
after 
18.15** -3.26 2.85 -0.001 8.02** -5.20 0.13 0.07** -0.18 -0.96 5.30 
(2.85) (-1.01) (1.12) (-0.80) (2.38) (-0.67) (0.05) (2.32) (-1.33) (-2.15)  
Return180 days 
after 
57.90*** -10.81 -2.29 -0.004 16.96** -17.47 -2.10 -0.05 -0.37 -2.62** 2.60 
(4.63) (-1.62) (-0.43) (-0.94) (2.53) (-1.08) (-0.36) (-0.94) (-1.31) (-2.81)  
 Return1 year 
after 
71.72*** -11.10 -3.74 -0.0006 17.27** -21.40 -3.22 -0.12* -0.63* -2.54** 1.81 
(4.50) (-1.31) (-0.56) (-0.11) (2.03) (-1.04) (-0.44) (-1.83) (-1.82) (-2.17)  
Canadian firms           
Returnone day 
after 
34.00 -1.59 27.73 0.001 12.30 7.61 -16.41 0.03 -2.75*** -0.96 3.83 
 
(1.65) (-0.12) (1.08) (0.40) (0.46) (0.23) (-1.56) (0.31) (-5.30) (-0.70)  
Return 1 month 
after 
51.63* -5.42 4.40 -0.005 25.48 8.22 -13.43 -0.02 -3.34*** -1.53 2.77 
 
(1.75) (-0.28) (0.12) (-1.26) (0.68) (0.18) (-0.86) (-0.19) (-4.57) (-0.81)  
Return180 days 
after 
38.97 1.27 -23.82 -0.008 27.98 25.22 -11.50 -0.04 -3.36** -2.11 0.88 
 
(0.73) (0.04) (-0.36) (-0.92) (0.41) (0.29) (-0.42) (-0.19) (-2.54) (-0.59)  
 Return1 year 
after 
-7.96 37.29 -30.03 -0.007 21.12 79.00 4.24 0.28 -3.44** -7.20 0.84 





Table 9 shows results of the OLS regression for the relationship between IPO performance and firm size of US and Canada firms. The regression equation is 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉 + 𝑎2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 +
𝑎3𝑀𝑉𝑃 + 𝑎4𝑉𝐶 + 𝑎5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ + 𝑎7𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑠 + 𝑎8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠. Return is abnormal returns at subperiods after IPOs, measured by the first aftermarket 
closing price to the earlier date. LnMV is natural logarithm of market values when firms going IPOs, which measures firm size based on market capitalization. Market value is measured in millions of dollars. Gross 
Spread measures firm costs when going public in terms of underwriter fees. MVP measures Money on the Table. VC refers whether firms are backed by venture capital or not. MultiClass represents a term of voting in 
board by using dummy variable. HighTech is a dummy variable verifying a firm belonging to high-tech or not. Lockups is a contractual restriction that prevents insiders who are holding a company's stock. CEO 
Dominance is the dominance of the CEO over the other team members. It is calculated as the ratio of salary of the CEO to that of the other members of the management team. Size of management teams is defined as 
the number of managers with the rank of vice-president or higher in the management team. P-values are in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***) levels. 













US firms            
Returnone day 
after 
2.43 -1.43* 3.13* -0.0009 8.71** 0.52 2.47 0.09*** -0.26 -0.50 10.86 
(0.78) (-1.85) (1.88) (-0.74) (3.52) (0.54) (1.14) (4.08) (-1.60) (-0.85)  
Return 1 month 
after 
14.47** 0.41 2.54 -0.002 7.50** -5.40 -1.33 0.08* -0.30 -0.79* 6.69 
(2.96) (0.67) (1.03) (-1.13) (2.80) (-0.69) (-0.23) (2.01) (-1.42) (-2.23)  
Return180 days 
after 
23.84* -2.24 -2.01 -0.004 10.07** -15.34 -3.07 0.35 -0.52 -1.73** 3.47 
(2.30) (-1.03) (-0.25) (-1.01) (3.05) (-1.06) (-0.67) (0.73) (-1.12) (-3.35)  
 Return1 year 
after 
32.05** 4.37 -5.21 -0.015 18.83* -20.91 -5.60 -0.12* -0.87* -2.40* 3.08 
(3.21) (1.26) (-0.58) (-0.58) (2.10) (-1.44) (-0.40) (-1.85) (-1.79) (-1.83)  
Canadian firms           
Returnone day 
after 
25.39* -1.43 26.64 0.03 8.97 9.14 -9.64 0.03 -2.53*** -0.32 3.94 
 
(1.90) (-0.74) (1.20) (0.42) (0.37) (0.32) (-0.99) (0.42) (-5.35) (-0.25)  
Return 1 month 
after 
44.99** 0.62 2.60 -0.005 23.59 8.58 -6.74 -0.05 -2.13* -1.58 2.85 
 
(2.33) (0.22) (0.08) (-1.30) (0.69) (0.57) (-0.89) (-0.61) (-1.80) (-0.98)  
Return180 days 
after 
29.05 -1.37 -24.95 -0.008 25.57 24.96 -5.12 -0.15 -2.68 -1.55 1.52 
 
(0.95) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-1.22) (0.47) (0.39) (-0.40) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-0.36)  
 Return1 year 
after 
5.42 -9.03 -46.26 -0.009 4.02 58.21 12.50 0.25 -3.25* -4.71 0.98 
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This table describes variables used in the paper, including dependent variables and independent variables.  
Variable Description 
Rsp1d 
Abnormal returns 1 day after IPOs, which represent IPO 
underpricing. 
Rsp30day Abnormal returns 30 days after IPOs 
Rsp180d Abnormal returns 180 days after IPOs 
Rsp1y Abnormal returns 1 year after IPOs 
Gross spread 
The difference (in MM) between the underwriting price received 
by the issuing company and the actual price offered to the 
investing public 
Total Assets Total assets (in MM) of companies at the end of the first IPO day 
MVafter offer 
Market values (in MM) of companies at the end of the first IPO 
day 
MVP 
The difference (in MM) between market value after and between 
IPOs. That difference is described as “Money left on table” 
Size_dummy 
Dummy variable of firm size classified by gross proceeds. If Size 
equals to 1, firms are classified as large firms (gross 
proceeds >54.4M); if Size equals to 0, firms are classified as 
small firms (gross proceeds <54.4M) 
LnMV 
Natural logarithm of market value (in MM) when firms going 
IPOs. 
High-tech 
Dummy variable of whether a company is high tech or not. If 
High-tech equals to 1, firms are high-tech firms. Otherwise, firms 
are non-high-tech firms. 
Lnproceeds 
Natural logarithm of IPO gross proceeds (in MM) of firms when 
going IPOs 
VC 
Dummy variable of whether a company is backed by venture 
capitals. VC equals to 1, VC-backed firms; otherwise, 0 
Lockup 
A predetermined time following an IPO where large shareholders 
are restricted from selling their shares.  
CEO 
Dominance 
Ratio of salary of the CEO to that of the other members of the 
management team. 
Size of      
management   
team 
The number of managers with the rank of vice-president or higher 
in the management team. 
 
